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ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of remittances from abroad on households’ schooling decisions using data
for El Salvador.  Following the massive war-related emigration of the 1980’s, remittances became
a significant source of household income throughout the 1990’s.  We use the Cox proportional
hazard model to examine the determinants of school attendance.  Measuring income from a source
that is uncorrelated with parental schooling– remittances– , we find that remittances have a large,
significant effect on school retention.  We estimate that while household income net of remittances
has a small, though significant, impact on the hazard of leaving school in rural and urban areas,
remittances have a much larger impact on the hazard of leaving school.  In urban areas, the effect
of remittances is, at its smallest, 10 times the size of the effect of other income.  In rural areas, the
effect of remittances is about 2.6 times that of other income.  Our finding is of interest in that it
suggests that subsidizing school attendance, particularly in poor areas, may have a large impact on
school attendance and retention, even if parents have low levels of schooling.
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Globalization is generally studied from the point of view of international trade, finance or 
migration.  One aspect of globalization that is less understood is that of remittances.  We 
examine the effect of remittances on households’ schooling decisions using data for El 
Salvador.  El Salvador has significantly expanded its educational coverage after the civil 
war that ended in 1989.  In 1997, 75 percent of rural children and 92 percent of urban 
children aged 12 were enrolled in school.  The recent higher rates of retention in school 
are a remarkable accomplishment for a country that has 30 percent illiteracy rate among 
adults aged 40 to 50, and 25 percent illiteracy among adults aged 30 to 40.  The record of 
expansion of the educational system in El Salvador during the 1960’s and 1970’s was 
dismal in comparison with the record of other developing countries.  Schultz (1989) notes 
that in the period from 1960 to 1981 El Salvador was the only country to report a decline 
in expected years of schooling, from 5.63 to 5.06 years, according to the 1984 World 
Development Report (table 25). 
 
There are two dimensions of the case of El Salvador that make it unique and interesting.  
First, the institutional setting for public policy in the educational sector is such that the 
expansion of school facilities is primarily driven by the active participation of parents in 
the allocation of public and private funds.  Parents have played a leading role financing 
the expansion of private schools, which have led the urban expansion.  To expand 
primary school coverage in rural areas, a priority of the government in the 1990’s, the 
Ministry of Education allocates resources to parents’ associations enabling them to hire 
teachers and buy materials.  
 
Second, following the massive out migration of the 1980’s, remittances from abroad have 
become a significant source of household income throughout the 1990’s.
 1  In 1997, 14 
percent of rural and 15 percent of urban households received remittances from relatives 
or friends living abroad.  Income from remittances expands the household budget 
                                                           
1 The literature has produced a number of studies that look into the flow of remittances, its persistence (see 
for example, Funkhouser (1992) and Montes (1990)) and its impact on the economy (see for example 
Lopez (1991)).   2
constraint allowing some families to find it optimal that their children acquire more 
schooling than they would acquire otherwise. 
 
Our sample is a cross-section of 14,286 individuals aged 6 to 24, from the 1997 Annual 
Household Survey.  This is a nationally representative sample collected by the National 
Statistics Office (Digestyc).  We use the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the 
impact of characteristics of the individual and the family—including remittances and 
income separately—on the hazard of dropping out of school.  We find that remittances 
have a significant impact on school retention.   
 
The use of the Cox proportional hazard model to study school attainment with cross-
sectional data is an innovation.
2  The model poses some challenges, which we address, 
and at the same time it offers several advantages over its alternatives.  First, the Cox 
proportional hazard model makes use of all the available information in observations for 
children or young adults who are enrolled in school at the time of the survey (9,547 of the 
14,286 in our sample) as well as for those who are no longer enrolled.  One popular 
alternative is to study school completion among older individuals, who are expected to 
have finished their formal education.  An analysis of school attainment based on the 
sample of individuals aged 25 and over would be especially undesirable in El Salvador 
where there have been recent efforts to expand school enrollment throughout the country.  
Second, the model yields estimates of survival functions, allowing us to establish, for 
example, that the 1980-83 urban birth cohort enjoyed the largest improvement in school 
attainment relative to the cohort immediately prior, and that the 1984-87 rural cohort 
experienced, by far, the largest improvement relative to the cohort that preceded it.  
Third, the model allows very flexible specifications, and we find, for example, that the 
                                                           
2    There are two papers that use proportional hazard models that came to our attention recently.   
Inchauste (2000) analyzes Bolivian data and uses a hazard model to estimate the probability that children 
quit school in period t+1 given that they attended school in period t.  The hazard estimates are weighted by 
the probability of being constrained (which is driven by variables such as “no financial resources”, school 
being “too far away”, and “having to work.”) Brown and Park (2001) use proportional hazard models to 
estimate the impact of several variables (including credit constraints) on the likelihood of dropping out of 
school at the primary and secondary level. Neither of these papers discusses the advantages or 
shortcomings of using Cox proportional hazard models as we do here.   3
effect of parental schooling on the hazard of leaving school falls as the level of the 
child’s schooling increases.   
 
In what follows we begin with a brief discussion of the literature followed by a 
description of the institutional setting of the school system in El Salvador; we then 




Assuming that parents care about their children’s well being and that they can borrow to 
finance productive investments, optimal investment in schooling is a function of net rates 
of return.  These in turn are a function of benefits and costs.  Differences in rates of 
return arising from exogenously determined, individual-specific traits, such as innate 
ability, likely provide a partial explanation for observed differences in completed 
schooling across members of a given family.  Differences in rates of return due to 
location-specific factors, such as distance to school, likely explain part of the difference 
in average completed schooling across residents of different towns.  Differences in rates 
of returns driven by economy-wide conditions, such as the labor market valuation of 
schooling, likely explain some of the difference in school completion levels across 
countries. 
  
If parents are unable to borrow to finance investments in education, all of the above 
forces still apply, but households’ decisions are going to be constrained by their own 
resources.  The Becker-Tomes (1976) model suggests that the amount poor parents are 
willing to invest in the child’s education will be smaller than the optimum under a non-
binding borrowing constraint, but this amount will be increasing in parental income up to 
the point at which the marginal return to investment is equal to the rate of interest.  When 
there is more than one child at home, parents also decide the allocation of resources 
across children (Behrman, Pollack, Taubman, 1991). 
   4
The literature on the schooling of children in developing countries has emphasized the 
role of family income constraints in explaining differences in school attainment.  The 
empirical work has found that family income, parental schooling, sex, residence, and 
family size are important determinants of school attainment.  Behrman and Wolfe (1984) 
use Nicaraguan data to show that family background (place of birth) and parental 
schooling, particularly the mother’s schooling, are important determinants of children’s 
school attainment.  Parish and Willis (1993) used Taiwanese data and found that the 
effects of parental income, and the size and composition of the family were strongest 
among older cohorts and poorer households.  They interpret this evidence as indicating 
that older cohorts and poorer households are more credit constrained than younger 
cohorts and richer households. Lillard and Willis (1994) used Malaysian data to study the 
effects of parents’ and grandparents’ schooling on children’s progress through the 
educational system.  Their data allows them to identify separately the effect of parental 
schooling from the effect of other time-varying variables on children’s school attainment.  
They find that at leas two-thirds of the impact of parental education on children’s 
schooling is a direct consequence of parent schooling while the remaining one-third can 
be attributed to unmeasured factors that influence educational attainment of parents and 
children. 
 
In the absence of longitudinal data, there are two problems when attempting to isolate the 
impact of genetic ability and the household budget constraint.  First, parental schooling 
may capture simultaneously genetic ability, motivation, and the capacity to generate 
income.  Second, current income is a poor measure of the household budget constraint, 
particularly in the context of important variability in current income relative to permanent 
income, leading to a downward bias in the estimated effect of household income in 
children's schooling (Haveman and Wolfe 1995).  This ambiguity is problematic for it 
weakens the support for income transfers as a means to improve opportunities for 
children whose parents lack schooling.  Studies that shed light on the marginal effects of 
the parental income versus schooling variables are especially valuable. 
   5
We examine a cross section of households in 1997, measure the school attainment of 
individuals aged 6 to 24, and estimate the impact of household characteristics on the 
hazard of dropping out of school.  Included in the household characteristics we measure 
are local indicators, parental schooling, income and remittances (where the last two are 
measured at the time of the survey).   The 1980’s out migration wave from El Salvador 
was primarily motivated by political factors. The peace accord was signed in 1992, and 
migration flows after 1992 are more likely to be explained by economic factors, 
including the presence of a migrant population in the United States. Therefore, our 
observed sample may include households receiving remittances because they have a one-
time political exile relative or friend living abroad, and households receiving remittances 
because they sent a family member to work and remit income from abroad.
  Remittances 
received by the first type of household are arguably equivalent to a randomly assigned 
income transfer, while remittances received by the second type are not.   
 
If remittances are randomly assigned across households, our analysis provides an unusual 
opportunity to identify separately the effect of income from that of parental schooling.  If 
migration has been driven primarily by economic reasons and remittances cannot be 
viewed as the result of random assignment, our study still makes the important 
contribution of focusing attention on the effect of remittances on human capital formation 
and quantifies the effect on school retention rates throughout primary and secondary 
schooling.  To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects of remittances 
on an important household decision using micro-level data. 
 
We argue that remittances are closer to a randomly assigned transfer, and that their 
measured effect is a cleaner estimate of the impact of relaxing a household’s budget 
constraint on school retention rates than is the measured effect of household income—
which is typically correlated with parental schooling.  We focus on three characteristics 
of households: family income, parental schooling, and the number of school-age 
children. We separate rural and urban households because of the significant differences 
in income and schooling across the rural-urban divide.  Comparing the location of 
recipient and non-recipient households along the distribution of these variables, we show   6
that all groups are likely to receive remittances.  In addition, we report the median 
amount of remittance and show that it is remarkably stable across the various groups. 
 
Household Characteristics and Remittances 
 
Table 1 reports the percentage of households receiving remittances that fall in each decile 
of the income distribution of non-recipient households, separately for urban and rural 
areas.  Non-recipient households represent 85% of urban and 86% of rural households. 
Column 2 in each panel of Table 1 reports the percentage of recipient households that fall 
in each decile when we measure pre-remittance income only.  In both regions, close to 
30% of households fall in the first decile of the distribution, and the remaining 
households are roughly evenly distributed throughout the other 9 deciles.  The over-
representation of households in the lowest decile of the income distribution does not 
imply that recipient households are significantly more likely to be poor households.  
These households have fewer members employed than non-recipient households so their 
income-generating capacity in the local economy must be lower than it is for non-
recipient households.
3  Column 3 in each panel shows the median remittance amount 
received by households in each decile.  Clearly, the remittance amount is independent of 
the pre-remittance income of the recipient households:  the within-decile median amount 
is typically 875 colones (100 U.S. dollars) or half that amount.  Of course, the addition of 
a remittance to household income changes the location of recipient households along the 
income distribution of non recipient households.  Column 4 in each panel reports the 
percentage of recipient households that fall in each decile of the income distribution of 
non-recipient households by post-remittance income.  In urban areas, the percentage of 
recipient households that fall in each decile is remarkably close to 10 percent, suggesting 
that households that have relatives abroad who send remittances come from every 
segment of the distribution of income.  There is no evidence of a pattern of self-selection 
where poor households are predominantly likely to receive funds from relatives living 
abroad. 
                                                           
3  In urban areas, the average recipient household has 1.35 workers against 1.7 in non-recipient household.  
In rural areas, the corresponding averages are 1.24 and 1.66.      7
 
In rural areas, recipient households are slightly under-represented in the three lowest 
deciles of the income distribution.  Note that the median remittance amount is the same in 
rural and in urban areas because it is largely determined by the expatriates’ earnings in 
the United States.  But since incomes are considerably lower in rural than in urban areas, 
remittances have a more pronounced effect on rural household income that shows up in 
an under-representation of recipient households in the three lowest deciles, and a slight 
over-representation in the top two deciles.  But the important point to note is that we find 
no pattern of self-selection where recipient families are predominantly likely to come 
from one segment of the distribution of household income. 
 
Table 2 shows that 28% of all households in El Salvador are female-headed.  While 
recipient households are more likely to be female-headed, 25% of non-recipient 
households are also female-headed.  An alternative measure of this relationship (not 
shown) is that 23% of female-headed households receive remittances against 11% of 
male-headed households.  Of course, political exiles and those emigrating for economic 
reasons are typically male, so the higher incidence of female-headed households among 
recipient households is unsurprising and sheds no light on the issue of which type of 
migration dominates the data. 
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of urban and rural households by the schooling of the 
adult female in the household—head of household or spouse.  The choice of the female 
adult to represent each household is deliberate, and it allows a cleaner comparison across 
households that may or may not have an adult male present.  Migration patterns in El 
Salvador have resulted in about 30% female-headed households, and female headship is 
more common among recipient households. Therefore, a comparison of parental 
characteristics between recipient and non-recipient households is better done controlling 
for adult female characteristics.  The urban and rural distributions of households across 
adult female schooling levels are fairly close for non-recipient and recipient households, 
though recipient households are somewhat over-represented in the lowest schooling 
category, 0 to 3 years of schooling.  If political exiles came from all walks of life in El   8
Salvador and the exiles represent the lion’s share of those working abroad, the 
educational distribution of the wives left behind would be similar to that of wives in non-
recipient households.  The fact that recipient households are somewhat over-represented 
in the lowest schooling categories suggests that migrants for economic reasons may have 
represented an ever increasing fraction of migration flows in the five years leading up to 
the 1997 survey (assuming that they come from the low end of the educational 
distribution and that assortative mating dominates).  
 
Table 4 organizes urban and rural households according to the number of school age 
children (children aged 6 and older).  We find no systematic differences in the 
distribution of recipient and non-recipient households by the presence of school-age 
children.  Finally, note that the median value of the remittance amount is 875 colones 
(US$100) in most cells in all three tables.
4 
 
Schooling in El Salvador  
 
The educational system in El Salvador is organized along four levels.  Children aged 4 to 
6 attend pre-school.  Children aged 7 to 15 attend primary education which is divided in 
three cycles of three years each, from first to ninth grade.  Children aged 16 to 18 attend 
secondary education which goes from tenth to twelfth grade.  Table 5, based on 1997 
data, shows the enrollment of children in the school system, by age categories.      
 
                                                           
4 The survey collects information on remittances, their amount and their use.  Respondents typically quote 
the remittances received in dollars, and these amounts are translated into local currency (colones) by the 
interviewers, using the official exchange rate.  We could have also considered using the information 
collected on expenditures and in particular, the amounts of remittances that are said to have been spent on 
education.  Nevertheless, we decided not to use the latter variable for two reasons. First, there is a 
significant discrepancy between the total amount of registered remittances and the total expenditure that 
they afford, with total expenditure being about 30 percent higher than the recorded amount received. We 
believe that expenditures are more likely to be measured with error, since there are several items involved.  
Second, the amount of remittances spent on education says nothing about the fact that remittances spent on 
other items will free resources that may be ultimately spent on education.  We therefore preferred to stay 
within the tradition of economic analysis and keep tabs on what families do about education rather than on 
the amounts they say they spend towards education.     9
There has been a rapid expansion in school enrollment throughout the 1990’s (Table 6). 
Note the significant increases in rural pre-school and primary coverage, and urban pre-
school and secondary coverage.  The levels of school attainment of recent birth cohorts in 
El Salvador are significantly higher than those of older cohorts.  This gain is the outcome 
of an important national effort, considering current standards of living in El Salvador.  
Table 7 reports school attainment levels for older individuals.  We see that no more than 
40 percent of the parents of current school-aged children completed primary education.   
 
Enrollment levels have yet to reach the equivalent of “universal primary coverage:” of 
the young aged 12, only 80 percent of rural residents and 90 percent of urban residents 
are enrolled in primary school.  As Table 5 suggests, rates of retention in primary 
education are relatively high, but there is slow progress through grades.  Once children 
get to the third cycle of primary schooling, 45 percent are in the grade corresponding to 
normal progress, 30.5 percent are behind, and 19 percent have abandoned the system (see 
MINED, 1997). 
 
The survey records answers to the question “Why is (a particular person) not attending 
school?”  Among primary school age children, the most frequent answers are “too 
expensive” and “age related reason.”  The first one suggests that the family’s budget 
constraint has a major impact on the decision to drop out of school.  The second answer 
hints at the role played by the child’s ability and/or the quality of schools, or may be an 
indication that the child never enrolled or started school late. 
 
Demand Driven Expansion 
El Salvador’s Community-Managed Schools Program (popularly known by the acronym, 
EDUCO, or Educación con Participación de la Comunidad) is an innovative program of 
public support for community managed schools. A prototype of today’s EDUCO schools 
emerged in the 1980’s when the civil war left a void in public education.  Some 
communities took the initiative to organize their own schools, administered and 
financially supported by a family-based association. While these early attempts were 
constrained by the low rural income base, they revealed a strong latent demand for   10
education, as well as a desire to participate in the governance of schools. In 1991, El 
Salvador’s Ministry of Education (MINED), with the support of international agencies, 
chose the implementation of the same prototype as the main method of expanding 
educational coverage in rural areas.  
 
The present EDUCO schools are managed autonomously by an elected Community 
Education Association (Asociación Comunal para la Educación or ACE) drawn from the 
parents of the students.  In EDUCO schools, the ACE performs a central role of 
administration and management: ACEs are contracted by MINED to deliver a given 
curriculum to an agreed upon number of students.  ACEs are charged with the close 




Data and Methodology 
 
The 1997 National Household Survey (Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 
EHPM) has national representation and covers 8,387 families.  We focus on the 
schooling attendance and family characteristics of individuals aged 6 to 24, about 40 
percent of the population.  Based on the survey data we can describe a number of 
important characteristics of each child’s family.  We have information on housing 
conditions, the age, schooling, income and labor force status of family members, the 
number of household members who are currently living abroad, and the value of 
remittances sent by expatriates.  
 
Our hypothesis is that parents make schooling decisions for their children on the basis of 
expectations of the returns on these investments.  Factors that influence the expected 
                                                           
5 The EDUCO program has become a very productive model for the modernization for the entire Ministry 
of Education (Jacir de Lovo, 1997).  Jimenez and Sawada (1998) compared student achievement on 
standardized tests and school attendance of rural students in EDUCO schools with the achievement and 
attendance of students in traditional schools. Their analysis controls for student characteristics and 
selection bias, using an exogenously determined formula for targeting EDUCO schools as an instrumental 
variable. They find that the rapid expansion of rural schools through EDUCO has diminished student 
absences and has not had an adverse effect on student achievement.    11
return to schooling are the cost of school attendance—out-of-pocket and opportunity 
costs—and the anticipated rewards in the labor market for skills acquired through formal 
schooling.  Parents will compare the expected returns from investing in the schooling of 
their children to the returns from alternative investments that will also increase a child’s 
human capital, like nutrition, health care, clothing and shelter.  Poor families may find it 
optimal to choose quite low levels of completed schooling for their children in order to 
enjoy a given level of consumption of food, health services, etc.  Low levels of 
completed schooling imply relatively low out-of-pocket expenses for schooling and 
enable the child to start working at an early age (the legal working age in El Salvador is 
10 years of age).  That is, in a poor country like El Salvador, the family’s budget 
constraint may play an important role in a family’s decision on school attendance of their 
children.
6   
 
Parents’ expectations of the rewards to skill in the labor market may depend on the 
parents’ own schooling levels.  More educated parents may be better informed about the 
employment opportunities and wages available to those with given schooling levels, or 
may themselves enjoy the rewards the labor market offers workers with above average 
education.  Therefore, parental schooling may play a role in a family’s choice of 
completed schooling for their children. 
 
Other factors that affect the perceived costs and benefits of schooling relate to the 
availability of schools offering the required grade levels within a reasonable commuting 
distance from the household.  We do not know the exact location of each household or 
the geographical distribution of schools offering given grade levels.  We do know, 
however, if a household resides in a rural area—where we expect less access to 
schools—and if the dwelling has access to neither electricity nor water, suggesting the 
household is located in a particularly remote area, or is an extremely poor household. 
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A model of parental schooling decisions for their children would not be complete without 
reference to another two factors.  First, it is reasonable to expect that parents’ decisions 
on the schooling of older children are made sequentially, taking into account the child’s 
school experience.  When a child is retained in grade, the return to continued investment 
in the child’s schooling is instantly reduced.  Retention in grade raises the cost of 
completing the same grade level with no change in benefits.  As we discuss below, we 
have access to a single cross-section for El Salvador.  The survey has very good 
information on school related behavior, but we do not know at what age an individual 
started school or if a person—in or out of school—was ever retained in grade.  While we 
would like to control for the age of children and young adults in a model of the 
probability of their continued school attendance, we cannot do it. 
 
The second factor that likely plays a role in parental decisions regarding a child’s 
schooling is the composition of the household.  The number and ages of siblings bears 
heavily on the family’s resources.  In order to capture fully the budget constraint of a 
family, income is clearly not enough.  We know the composition of each household at the 
time of the survey, but we do not know it at any other time.  In particular, we do not 
know it at the various stages in a child’s life when the composition of the household may 
have played an important role in determining whether the child would continue on to the 
next cycle of education, for example the second cycle (grades 4 through 6). 
 
The Statistical Model 
Our sample is a cross-section of 14,286 individuals aged 6 to 24.  We know the sex, age 
and school attainment of the individual, characteristics of the family, place of residence, 
and properties of the dwelling where they live.  We assume that children of school age 
who are not enrolled in school have dropped out of school, and use the Cox proportional 
hazard model to estimate the impact of characteristics of the individual and the family on 
the hazard of dropping out of school. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Compulsory free schooling is a way to overrule parental doubts on the potential benefits of education. 
Nevertheless, in El Salvador as in most developing countries, compulsory primary education is not 
enforced, and schooling is not free or readily available to all children.   13
 
The choice of the proportional hazard model is somewhat unusual in the modeling of 
school attainment levels, and warrants some discussion.  The Cox proportional hazard 
model is tailored for the analysis of survival-time data, and, clearly, the number of “years 
of completed schooling” does not correspond one-to-one with calendar time because 
children can be retained in grade.  The question, then, is whether the proportional hazard 
framework is acceptable for the analysis of school attainment.  We will argue it is.   
 
The hazard framework requires that we choose one of two possible “outcomes” for each 
individual in the sample: the individual is enrolled in school (“right-censored”) or is not 
enrolled (“failed”).  We have a single cross-section and no retrospective information on 
enrollment behavior.  Thus, we have no choice but to treat every individual who is not 
enrolled in school on the day of the survey as if they have “failed.” 
 
The proportional hazard model adapted to the case in question assumes that the observed 
fraction of the population that dropped out after grade t, relative to those that completed 
grade t, is:    
 
h(t) =  h0(t) * exp{xi'β } 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard of leaving school after grade t, which is left unspecified 
and is estimated; xi’ is a vector of covariates, and β  is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated.  The crucial assumption in the Cox proportional hazard model is that the effect 
of the covariates is proportional over the entire base line. 
 
The Cox proportional hazard model has several features that make it an attractive 
statistical framework for the problem at hand.  The most obvious advantage is that it 
exploits all the available information in observations that are right-censored, that is, 
observations for children or young adults who are enrolled in school at the time of the 
survey (9,547 of the 14,286 in our sample).  We can avoid the unappealing practice of 
limiting the sample to individuals aged 25 and over who are expected to have finished   14
their formal education.  In the case of El Salvador, this practice would be especially 
undesirable since it is only recently that the government has engaged in a bold effort to 
expand grade availability in rural areas and increase school enrollment generally 
throughout the country.  A focus on older birth cohorts would give us no insight into 
recent educational trends in El Salvador. 
 
Another desirable feature of the Cox proportional hazard model is that it readily yields an 
estimate of the underlying baseline hazard function, enabling us to identify the grade 
levels where dropout rates are concentrated, net of the effect of measured determinants of 
school completion.  This information may be useful for policy makers seeking to further 
expand school enrollment. 
 
In the empirical analysis, we include everyone in the sample aged 6 to 24, who does not 
have missing information.  Note that the sample includes individuals who have never 
attended school.  This highlights another convenient feature of the Cox proportional 
hazard approach.  Since time, in and of itself, is not of the essence for the analysis, we 
model the determinants of “never enrolling in school” much like we model the decisions 
regarding continuing to attend school.  That is, we view “never enrolled” as the first stage 
of the schooling process. Everyone in the sample “enters the study” (in the jargon of bio-
statistics) through this stage which has an arbitrarily chosen length of time.  Then, there 
is a probability that a child will not “fail” and continues on to enroll in the first grade.  
Put differently, the hazard of “failing” in the “not enrolled” interval simply refers to the 
hazard of never enrolling in school at all.
 7 
 
Some of the older individuals in the sample have completed more than 12 years of 
schooling.  There are few such cases and we are primarily interested in school attainment 
in primary and secondary school.  So we focus our attention on grades 1 through 12 by 
                                                           
7 The distinction between failure to enroll and drop-out hazard has generally been overlooked.  A notable 
exception is Filmer and Pritchet (2000).  Interestingly enough, their results show that the enrollment 
profiles of the poor differ across countries but fall into distinctive regional patterns: in some regions the 
poor reach nearly universal enrollment in first grade, but then drop out in droves leading to low attainment   15
truncating an individual’s completed schooling at 12 years if he or she has more than 12 
years of completed schooling, and treat the observation as right censored. 
 
Note that we are examining a cross section with individuals of different ages, some 
currently in school and some who dropped out of school in the past.  We have a single 
cross section, and find ourselves in the unenviable position of having to limit the vector 
of covariates to factors that we can argue convincingly can be treated as time-invariant.  
Some determinants of the parents’ schooling choices for their children are clearly grade-
level-invariant, for example the child’s sex and the schooling levels of the parents.  Our 
empirical specification also includes an indicator variable equal to one if the household 
has no access to water or electricity, and a set of variables that measure income and the 
presence and amount of remittances received from abroad. 
 
Operational Definitions of the Covariates 
Before turning to details of the specification we estimate, we list the set of covariates and 
give their operational definitions.  The covariates include an indicator variable for sex 
(equal to 1 if male).  We control for a child’s sex to allow for the possibility that parents 
expect different returns to investment in schooling for boys and girls, all else equal.  
 
We include an indicator variable for a household’s lack of access to water and electricity 
(equal to 1 if there is no access) to serve as a proxy for local conditions.  Presumably, 
lack of access to these basic services is correlated with low population density and long 
distances to schools, factors that increase the cost of attending school, and lower the 
returns.  While we realize that access to basic services is not strictly time invariant, we 
expect it to be nearly so and include it in our vector of covariates.  Even though internal 
migration is common, it is far less common for an entire family to change residence, 
especially in the rural areas where families typically own the piece of land where they 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(typical of South America), while in other regions the poor never enroll in school (typical of South Asia 
and Western/Central Africa).    16
reside.  Also, internal migration is more likely among young adults that are starting a 
family.
8   
 
Parental schooling has been found to be significant in explaining the school attainment of 
children.  Often times, the effect of father’s schooling is different from that of mother’s 
schooling.  We chose not to test for differences in the effect of paternal and maternal 
schooling levels because in El Salvador close to 30 percent of households have absent 
fathers. An attempt to test for the separate effects of paternal and maternal schooling 
results in a loss of too many observations, and runs the serious risk of yielding a highly 
selected, non-representative sample of households.  We created a variable, “Parental 
Schooling,” equal to the higher of the two parents’ schooling, if both are present, or the 
schooling of the parent who is present when one is absent. 
 
The remaining three covariates pertain to household income and the presence and amount 
of remittances.  We include the survey variable “household income,” measured in 
colones per month, to capture the budget constraint of the child’s household.  As other 
studies have found, we expect that higher incomes will lower the hazard of leaving 
school.  Two questions are of interest.  First, does household income influence school 
attainment?  Second, does income from remittances have the same effect as household 
income from work in the local economy?  To answer the last question we exclude the 
remittance amount from the measure of household income and include it as a separate 
covariate.
9    
                                                           
8 The 1997 Household Survey we use does not have information on internal migration.  Issues related to 
migrant families can be examined with the 1998 Household Survey that includes a migration module. 
9 The standard of living in urban areas of El Salvador is significantly higher than in rural areas, so it is 
unclear how to measure correctly the impact of an additional colon from remittances on a household’s 
budget constraint.  We experimented with an alternative metric for household income and remittances.  In 
the alternative specification, the variable “Location in the income distribution (net of remittance)” is 
measured in integers ranging from 1 to 20 that correspond to the location (in intervals of 5 centiles) of a 
given income level in the income distribution, excluding remittances.  Thus “Location in the income 
distribution (net of remittance)” will be equal to 1 if the household income is in the bottom 5 centiles of the 
income distribution for the area (urban or rural) where it resides.  We then added to each recipient 
household’s income, the income from remittances.  The location on the income distribution will tend to 
worsen for those without remittances, and will improve for those with remittances.  The change in location 
is measured in units of 5 centile points and ranges from 0 (for no change) to 19 (for a change from the 
lowest to the highest 5 centiles in the distribution).  “Change in location due to remittance” will be equal to   17
Income from remittances will also expand the family’s budget constraint, allowing some 
families to move closer to the optimum amount of schooling for their children. We note 
that the typical amount of remittances is 100 dollars, or 875 colones.  As Table 8 shows, 
the median remittance represents a more significant fraction of incomes of rural than 
urban families: remittances represent 46 percent of household incomes for the median 
rural recipient and 27 percent for the median urban recipient household.  On average, 
remittances make up 49 percent and 37 percent of income for rural and urban recipient 
households. 
 
In addition to controlling for household income and income from remittances, we include 
an indicator for the presence of income from remittances (equal to 1 if the household 
receives remittances from abroad).  We believe that the massive out-migration in El 
Salvador during the 1980’s was driven primarily by political rather than economic 
factors.  But we want to allow for the possibility that households that receive remittances 
differ systematically, for unobserved reasons, from other households.  In fact, even if the 
initial stimulus for migrating was political, families receiving remittances have already 
experienced direct benefits from migration.  One can argue that these families attach a 
higher value to the migration option for their own children than do other families.  This 
effect alone may well cause differences across families in the expected returns from 
schooling, and in the hazard of leaving school.  More generally, the indicator variable 
will capture any additional effect of remittances on children’s schooling that acts through 
channels other than the budget constraint, and any systematic differences in attitudes 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 if the family’s income including the remittance falls 2 intervals to the right of its initial location in the 
income distribution, that is, when excluding the amount of the remittance. 
   The hazard model that uses the metric described above yields a slightly higher value for the log-
likelihood function for the urban sample, and a slightly lower value for the rural sample.  Regarding the 
remaining coefficient estimates, they are quite invariant to the choice of metric for income and remittances.  
We implemented a test proposed by Weesie (1999) that is a generalization of Hausman’s test, of the null 
hypothesis that the remaining coefficients are equal in the two specifications.  (Note that this is not a nested 
hypothesis.)  For the urban sample the test-statistic is equal to 12.41 and is distributed chi-squared with 6 
degrees of freedom.  We fail to reject the null hypothesis; the p-value for the test is 0.0534.  For the rural 
sample the test-statistic is equal to 13.08 and is distributed chi-squared with 8 degrees of freedom.  We fail 
to reject the null hypothesis; the p-value for the test is 0.1090.   
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toward the schooling of children across families that do and those that do not receive 
remittances. 
 
It should be noted that the appropriate variable that influences investment on children is 
permanent household income.  What we use is a crude proxy of the variable, which is 
household income in one particular year separated in two components, remittances and 
the rest.  Arguing that income and the presence of remittances are time-invariant 
covariates is perhaps a bit heroic.  While it is probably the case that income mobility in 
El Salvador is quite low, a question arises with respect to the stability through time of 
remittances vs. other income.  If remittances are more stable, they are a better measure of 
permanent income relative to other observed income.  We return to these issues as we 
examine the results.  
 
There are two variables we intended to use as covariates, “year of birth” and an indicator 
variable for residence in the rural areas.  The reason for controlling for year of birth is 
simply to pick up any systematic differences between cohorts.  The differences could be 
due to the implementation of educational reform by the government or any effects that 
the civil war of the 1980’s had on the operation of the schools or children’s ability to 
attend school.  For reasons discussed in detail in the Appendix, our preferred 
specification is one where we stratify on year of birth and we estimate separate models 
for the urban and rural samples. 
 
We estimate separate models for the urban and rural samples allowing separate effects for 
the four segments of the baseline hazard, and we stratify each sample on 5 strata 
according to year of birth.  The segments are “never enrolled,” 1
st through the 6
th grade, 
7
th through the 9
th grade, and 10
th through the 12
th grade.
10  The four oldest strata 
                                                           
10We divided the baseline hazard into the segments listed in text based on the following considerations.  
Primary education is divided into three cycles of three grades each.  Therefore, when distance to school 
becomes a problem, it is likely it will happen when a child is ready to enroll in the next cycle of primary 
education or secondary education.  In addition, public education becomes relatively scarce at the third 
cycle of primary education, and close to half of secondary education is private.  This suggests that out-of-
pocket costs of additional years of schooling beyond the sixth grade rise relative to schooling at younger 
ages.  In addition, in the early stages of estimation we divided the hazard further, allowing for separate   19
combine individuals born in four-year intervals: 1972 to 1975, 1976 to 1979, 1980 to 





To provide a context for the estimation results, we begin by presenting Kaplan-Meier 
estimates of the survival functions in Figure 1.  It is immediately apparent that children 
living in urban areas have a significantly higher probability of attaining any given level 
of school completion than rural children do.  For example, rural children have a 
probability of .60 of completing the 6
th grade, compared to over .85 for urban children.  
The gap only widens at higher-grade levels.  Urban children have a probability of .70 of 
completing the 12
th grade, compared to only .30 for rural children.   The graphed 
functions also highlight the more common exit points from schooling for children.  The 
survival functions show large declines at the 3
rd, 6
th, and 9
th grades, especially in rural 
areas. 
 
Of the individuals in our estimation sample (individuals aged 6 to 24 who have no 
missing values), 55 percent of those in urban areas live in households that have 2 or more 
children in the sample.  The corresponding figure is 65 percent in the rural sample.  To 
allow for correlation in the “residuals” of family members, that is, to allow for a 
household effect, we compute robust estimates of variance by clustering observations on 
a family identifier. 
 
The estimates of the determinants of the hazard of dropping out of school are 
summarized in Tables 9 and 10.  The (exponentiated) coefficient for the indicator 
variable “Male” is significantly different from one in urban areas, where males are 27 
percent more likely to drop out of school (or never enroll in school at all).  One possible 
                                                                                                                                                                             
effects for the 1
st through the 3
rd grade, and the 4
th through the 6
th grade.  But we did not reject the null 
hypothesis that the segments could be combined into one covering the 1
st through the 6
th grade.   20
explanation for this finding is that boys have better labor market opportunities than do 
girls, and thus face higher opportunity costs of attending school.  
 
In rural areas, the effect of sex is not proportional over the entire baseline hazard.  Boys 
have a higher hazard than do girls of never enrolling in school and of leaving school after 
the first two cycles of primary education.  The estimated hazard ratio is 1.16, or a 16 
percent higher hazard.  This effect is qualitatively similar to the estimated effect of sex in 
urban areas.  What is puzzling is that for grades 1 through 6, the hazard of leaving school 
is 10 percent lower for boys than girls in rural areas.  The coefficients in question are 
statistically significantly different from one another, and we do not have an explanation 
for this pattern of effects.   
 
Interestingly, the dampening effect of higher parental schooling on the hazard of leaving 
school declines monotonically as a child reaches ever higher-grade levels.  In urban 
areas, each year of additional parental schooling lowers the hazard that a child leaves 
school (or never enrolls) by 20 percent, while the child is attending one of the first two 
cycles of primary education.  Once the child is enrolled in the third cycle, 7
th through the 
9
th grade, an additional year of parental schooling only lowers the hazard by 14 percent.  
And the effect on the hazard for secondary education is lower still: 7 percent.  The 
estimated coefficients are statistically significantly different for the three segments of the 
hazard. 
 
In rural areas much the same pattern is observed, though the estimated effects of parental 
schooling on the hazard of leaving school are smaller than they are in urban areas.  An 
additional year of parental schooling has the largest estimated effect on the hazard that a 
child will never be enrolled in school: the hazard drops 16 percent with each additional 
year of parental schooling.
11  For children attending grades 1 through 6, an additional 
                                                           
11 This may appear to be too large of an effect.  But average parental schooling in rural areas is close to 
three years of schooling.  Thus, the child of a parent with 3 years of schooling has a hazard of never 
enrolling in school that is only 59 percent (exp(-.177× 3)=.588) as high as the hazard for a child whose 
parents have no schooling.   21
year of parental schooling lowers the hazard of leaving school by 13 percent.  For 
youngsters attending grades 7 through 12, the effect drops to 8 percent. 
 
Despite the previous discussion, we cannot conclude that parental schooling is a 
weightier factor for children’s schooling in urban than in rural areas.  As seen in Figure 1, 
the survival function is significantly higher in urban than rural areas; correspondingly, 
the hazard function is significantly lower in urban than rural areas.  The combined effects 
of the coefficient estimates for parental schooling and the level of the baseline hazard 
functions is illustrated in Figure 2.   We graph the estimated survival functions evaluated 
at the 10
th centile, the 1
st quartile, the median, the 3
rd quartile and the 90
th centile of the 
distribution of parental schooling, separately for urban and rural areas.  We set income at 
the median for each area, and graph the estimated baseline survival functions for boys 
belonging to the 1976-1979 birth cohorts (all other covariates are set to zero).  The graph 
for urban areas appears to have only 4 survival functions.  The reason for this is that the 
survival functions for the third quartile and the 90
th centile overlap completely.  Clearly, 
the effect of parental schooling on the hazard of leaving school in urban areas is 
concentrated in the bottom half of the parental schooling distribution.  Children whose 
parents have above average schooling levels have survival probabilities close to 1, when 
evaluated at the median household income. 
 
The graph for rural areas has 4 survival functions because the 10
th decile and the 1
st 
quartile of the distribution of parental schooling is the same: 0 years of schooling.  Recall 
that the estimated coefficients of parental schooling are smaller for rural parents, but the 
hazard of leaving school is considerably higher in rural areas.  As a result, the overall 
effect of parental schooling in rural areas is quite important, and operates over the entire 
distribution of parental schooling. 
 
The coefficient on lack of access to water or electricity is significant in both regions and 
much larger in urban areas.  Lacking access to basic services increases the hazard of 
leaving school (or never enrolling) by 150 percent in urban areas.  In rural areas, lacking 
access to basic services increases the hazard of never enrolling in school by 86 percent,   22
the hazard of leaving school while enrolled in the 1
st through the 6
th grade by 33 percent, 
and there is no effect on the hazard beyond the 6
th grade.  While 38 percent of rural 
households lack water and electricity, only 5 percent of urban families lack water and 
electricity.   Therefore, this large difference in the estimated coefficients only applies to 
the 5 percent of urban families that live in extremely poor conditions.  
 
Household income has a proportional effect over the entire baseline hazard for the urban 
areas.  This suggests that the household’s budget constraint plays a significant role in the 
choice of schooling level for children, and the effect does not diminish as the children 
attain ever-higher grade levels.  The (exponentiated) estimated coefficient in urban areas 
is .996, indicating that an increase in household income of 100 colones lowers the hazard 
that a child will never enroll in school or will leave school once enrolled by 0.4 percent. 
A movement from the first to the third quartile of the urban income distribution (1,517 to 
4,583 colones) lowers the hazard by 12 percent.  The estimated effect of income is 
weaker in rural areas.  Household income has no effect on the hazard of leaving school 
beyond the 6
th grade.  Yet, household income lowers the hazard that a child will never 
enroll in school or will leave school before reaching the 6
th grade.  The point estimate is 
.993, indicating that a movement from the first to the third quartile of the rural income 
distribution (750 to 2,225 colones) lowers the hazard by 10 percent. 
 
To assess the practical importance, as opposed to the statistical significance, of household 
income we graph the baseline survival functions for boys in the 1976-79 birth cohorts.  
The functions, presented in Figure 3, are evaluated at the 10
th centile, 1
st quartile, median, 
3
rd quartile, and 90
th centile of the distribution of household income, separately for urban 
and rural areas.   Also, the functions correspond to median parental schooling: 6 years in 
urban areas, and 2 years in rural areas.  Figure 3 makes it abundantly clear that household 
income has a very small effect on the survival functions, even though the effect is more 
pronounced for rural households.  We also examined the survival functions evaluated at 
the 1
st quartile of the distribution of parental schooling.  The survival functions are of 
course lower than those graphed in Figure 3, but they convey the same message:    23
household income has a very modest effect on the hazard of leaving school, regardless of 
the level of parental schooling.     
 
This result is consistent with previous literature.  Haveman and Wolfe (1995) review a 
number of studies on the determinants of years of schooling based on U.S. data and 
report that income elasticities have been found to be low and estimated in a wide range, 
from .02 to .2.  They believe this result is likely explained by the measurement error in 
the household income variable.  At the same time, Hill and Duncan (1987) carefully 
measure household income and report that a 10 percent increase in household income, 
after controlling for a number of other variables, is associated with an increase in school 
attainment of less than 1 percent. 
  
Now we turn our attention to remittances.  As we explained earlier, we estimate separate 
effects for income from remittances and from other sources to examine the possibility 
that the source of the income matters for the choice of schooling levels of children.  
Economic theory suggests that the source of income should not matter—a dollar is a 
dollar.   
 
We estimate a significant and large effect of income from remittances.  In urban areas, 
the median remittance (875 colones) lowers the hazard that a child will never enroll in 
school, or will leave school while enrolled in the 1
st through the 6
th grade, by 54 percent 
(exp(− .0877× 8.75) = .46).  The estimated effect for the remaining segments of the 
hazard, grades 7
th through 12
th, is .965, or 27 percent when evaluated at the median 
remittance amount.  So the effect is half as high for children beyond the 6
th grade as for 
children below the 7
th grade.  Note that the estimated coefficients for the two income 
effects are statistically significantly different from one another.  More importantly, there 
is an enormous difference in the magnitude of the effects depending on the income 
source: the effect of remittances is, at its smallest, 10 times the size of the effect of other 
income.
12 
                                                           
12 We estimated a hazard model where the effect of income was allowed to differ between households that 
do and do not receive remittances.  For the urban sample, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the   24
 
In rural areas, the median remittance lowers the entire baseline hazard by 14 percent.    
That is, the hazard of a child leaving school (or failing to enroll) is 14 percent 
(exp(− .0171× 8.75) = .86) lower if the child’s family receives the median remittance 
amount.  The estimated coefficients for the two income effects are statistically 
significantly different from one another, and the magnitudes of the effects are not close: 
the effect of remittances is 2.6 times higher than the effect of other income. 
 
If income from remittances is more stable than other sources of income, a likely situation 
for rural households, income from remittances is a better proxy for permanent income 
than is other income and this may explain the difference in estimated effects.
13  Another 
possible explanation for the difference is that remittances recipients may exhibit a higher 
propensity to spend on their children’s schooling out of remitted funds than other funds, 
perhaps because the expatriate family member has made it a condition for the financial 
support.  In any case, whether the source of the income makes a difference is an 
empirical issue, regardless of our ability to tell a story that accounts for the observed 
behavior. 
 
The presence of remittances in the urban areas has no effect on the hazard of leaving 
school, after controlling for the amount of the remittance, so the variable “Receives 
remittance” does not appear among the covariates.  This means that urban households 
that receive remittances from abroad do not differ systematically from other urban 
households with regards to the schooling of their children, though the funds from 
remittances have a vastly larger effect on the hazard of leaving school than funds from 
other sources. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
effect of income from other sources is equal for both types of households is equal to 0.11, with one degree 
of freedom, and a p-value of 0.742.  Consequently, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of same effect.  The 
same result applies for rural households, in which case the test statistic is equal to 1.58, with a p-value 
equal to 0.209. 
13 Edwards (2000) reports that the fraction of households that receive remittances has been remarkably 
stable –between 14.4 and 15.6 percent- between 1992 and 1997.  This is the short time period for which 
remittances income is measured in the national household survey that measures living standards.      25
The presence of remittances in rural households has a large effect on the hazard of 
leaving school.  Children in those households have a 24 percent lower hazard.  That is, in 
rural areas the source of income matters less than in urban areas, but the mere existence 
of remittances as an income source tends to reduce the hazard of leaving school.  Rural 
families receiving remittances appear, then, to differ systematically from other rural 
families in that, all else constant, their children show a lower hazard of leaving school, at 
all grade levels.   
 
Overall, the effect on the hazard of leaving school of receiving a remittance of 100 U.S. 
dollars (the median amount in both areas) is greater for children in urban than in rural 
households.  In urban areas a remittance of 875 colones (100 dollars) lowers the hazard 
by 54 percent for children below the 7
th grade, and 27 percent for youngsters beyond the 
6
th grade.  In rural areas, the same remittance amount, combined with the effect of the 
presence of the remittance, lowers the hazard by 25 percent at all grade levels.  To gauge 
whether the effect of remittances is of practical importance, in Figure 4 we graph the 
baseline survival functions for boys in the 1976-79 birth cohorts, evaluated at no 
remittance and at the median remittance of 875 colones.  The functions are evaluated at 
the median of parental schooling and household income, separately for urban and rural 
areas.  Note that in the case of rural children, the survival function showing the effect of 
the median remittance includes the effect of the presence of the remittance itself.   
 
In urban areas, a remittance of 875 colones has a small effect on the baseline survival 
function.  But note that the survival function evaluated at the median parental schooling 
and median household income is very high at all grade levels.  There isn’t much room for 
the remittance to have an effect.  And yet, it has the effect of raising the survival function 
to near 1.  In rural areas, the effect of a remittance in the median amount is substantial 
and operates at all grade levels. 
 
Cohort Trends 
The estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model stratified by birth cohort yields 
estimates of the underlying baseline hazard and survival function for each birth cohort.    26
We report the survival functions corresponding to our preferred specification in Tables 
11 and 12, and plot the baseline hazards and the survival functions for the four earliest 
birth cohorts in Figures 5 through 8.  Following the same procedure used for the previous 
figures, we graph baseline functions where parental schooling and household income are 
set to their median values for each area.  The survival and hazard functions, then, apply 
to boys living in dwellings with access to water or electricity and whose household does 
not receive a remittance from abroad. 
 
The first row of figures in Tables 11 and 12, labeled Grade Level 0, present the value of 
the survival function for the outcome “enrolls in school.”  That is, the value .971 (oldest 
birth cohort in the urban areas) implies that a child has a .971 probability of enrolling in 
the first grade.  It also implies that, for that birth cohort, we estimate that .029, or 2.9 
percent, of that cohort never enrolled in school. 
 
The survival functions for urban and rural children born in 1988 through 1990 are lower 
than the functions for earlier cohorts.  This does not mean that grade attainment levels are 
declining for recent birth cohorts.  Recall that we include everyone between the ages of 6 
and 24 in the sample.  A high fraction of children aged 6 and 7 are not enrolled in school 
in 1997.  This is not a surprise.  The distribution of ages for children enrolled in the first 
grade shows many children aged 7 and 8 and even older children.  We observe the 
children born in 1990 when they are 7 years old, and a large fraction of this group is not 
enrolled in school yet, which explains the estimates of the survival functions for this 
cohort. 
 
The survival functions reveal immense progress in school retention rates for recent birth 
cohorts in El Salvador.  Traditional “exit” points have been the highest grade in each 
three-year cycle of primary education: the 3
rd, 6
th, and 9
th grades.  The estimate of the 
survival function for the 4
th grade increases from .902 for those born in the years 1972-75 
to .941 for those born in 1984-87, in urban areas.  The improvement is even more 
pronounced in rural areas.  The estimate increases from .445 to .797, implying a near   27
doubling of the probability that rural children will enroll in the 4
th grade or beyond, 
bringing the survival probabilities much closer to those observed in urban areas.   
 
Retention rates beyond the 6
th grade show even more improvement.  In urban areas, the 
estimate of the survival function for the 7
th grade increases from .808 for the 1972-75 
cohorts to .929 for the 1984-87 cohorts.  The improvement is even more pronounced in 
rural areas.  For grade level 7, the estimate of the survival function increases from .192 
for the earliest cohort to .773 for children born in 1984-87, a four-fold increase, and one 
that makes the probability of enrolling in the 7
th grade in rural areas considerably closer 
to those observed in urban areas. 
 
The probability that children will enroll in secondary education has increased almost 20 
percentage points in urban areas, and increased three-fold in rural areas, between the 
cohorts born in 1972-75 and those born in 1980-83.  For the 1980-83 cohorts, the 
probability is .884 in urban and .333 in rural areas.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 make evident the timing of the improvements highlighted above.  
Focusing on the survival function at the 6
th grade, in urban areas we see a steady, gradual 
rising of the survival probability as we move from the earliest to the most recent cohorts.  
In contrast, in rural areas we see little improvement for the 1976-79 cohorts compared to 
the 1972-75 cohorts.  But then we see a big upward shift of the survival function for 
those born in 1980-83, and an even bigger shift for the 1984-87 cohort.  More generally, 
the survival functions for the urban areas suggest that the 1980-83 cohorts enjoyed the 
largest improvement relative to the cohort immediately prior.  In rural areas, the 1984-87 
cohorts experienced, by far, the largest improvement relative to the cohort that preceded 
it. Clearly, improvements in retention rates were delayed in rural compared with urban 
areas. 
 
There is another interesting aspect to the timing of the improvement in school retention 
rates.  Note that the children born in the years 1980 to 1983—the cohorts enjoying the 
largest relative improvement in urban areas—were aged 6 to 9 in 1989, the year that the   28
civil war ended.  Those children were at the beginning of their school careers, and it 
appears that they benefited greatly from the ending of the civil war.  Put differently, the 
civil war probably disrupted significantly the functioning of schools and impoverished a 
large number of families with the unfortunate consequence that many children of 
schooling age in the decade of the 1980’s received very little schooling.  The delayed 
improvement in school retention rates in rural areas perhaps can be explained by the 
severity of the effects of the civil war and the fact that it took longer for things to go back 
to normal in the rural areas.  Another contributing factor may be the higher rate of 
retention in grade in rural than urban areas. 
 
Finally, Figures 7 and 8 present the estimated baseline hazards.  The hazards for the 
urban area show that improvement in retention rates has been concentrated in the 
traditional “exit” points.  There has been scant progress up through the 5
th grade, but the 
hazard has decreased significantly at the 6
th and 9
th grades, as we move from the earliest 
to the more recent cohorts.  In sharp contrast, in rural areas the improvement has 




We study school attainment with cross-sectional data using the Cox proportional hazard 
model.  This technique is particularly attractive to examine data for El Salvador because 
there has been a significant expansion in school attainment in the recent years. The 
estimates reveal immense progress in school retention rates for recent birth cohorts in El 
Salvador.  
 
The estimated survival functions for the urban areas suggest that the 1980-83 birth 
cohorts enjoyed the largest improvement relative to the cohort immediately prior.  In 
rural areas, the 1984-87 cohorts experienced, by far, the largest improvement relative to 
the cohort that preceded it.  Clearly, improvements in retention rates were delayed in 
rural compared with urban areas.  The cohorts enjoying the largest relative improvement 
in urban areas were aged 6 to 9 in 1989, the year the civil war ended.  These children   29
were luckier than their older siblings were; they benefited from government efforts to 
increase enrollment in primary schooling, especially in rural areas.  These efforts were a 
central component of the peace process. 
 
The key determinant of school retention is parental schooling.  The evidence of strong 
correlation between parental schooling and school survival both in urban and rural areas 
is especially interesting in El Salvador, because of the significant differences in school 
availability between urban and rural areas.  It suggests that the task of increasing school 
retention would generally take several generations, and would continue in spite of the 
expansion of school facilities.   
 
Among the factors that affect the costs and benefits of schooling we are particularly 
interested in the effect of income and the possible impact of remittances.  The evidence 
from El Salvador sends a powerful message regarding the impact of the budget constraint 
on school retention rates.  We find that budgets have a small, though significant, impact 
on the hazard of leaving school in rural and urban areas. But we find that remittances 
have a much larger impact on the hazard of leaving school.  In urban areas, the effect of 
remittances is, at its smallest, 10 times the size of the effect of other income.  In rural 
areas, the effect of remittances is about 2.6 times that of other income.   In addition, the 
presence of remittances—irrespective of amounts—lowers the hazard of leaving school 
in rural areas but has no effect in urban areas.  
 
Our finding that parental schooling has a significant effect on the hazard of leaving 
school is consistent with previous literature.  As others have argued, parental schooling 
may simultaneously capture genetic ability, motivation, and the capacity to generate 
income.  This ambiguity is problematic for it weakens the policy implications for 
improving opportunities for children who lack schooling.  We measure income from a 
source that is not directly correlated with parental schooling—remittances, and find that 
remittances have a larger effect than other types of income on school retention.  This 
suggests that relaxing the budget constraint of poor households does have an effect on 
children’s school attainment, even if parents have low levels of schooling.      31
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Table 1.  Location of Households Receiving Remittances in the Income 
Distribution of Households that Do Not Receive Remittances 
 
Urban Households    Rural Households 
Households receiving remittances  Households receiving remittances
Income  
distribution 






















































1  27.4  875    6.3    1  36.5  875    3.1 
2    9.9  875    9.2    2    8.4  525    5.1 
3    9.6  586  10.5    3    9.9  438    6.0 
4  10.8  875    9.2    4    6.2  875  12.1 
5    5.6  438  11.6    5    5.0  438  10.2 
6    7.9  586  10.3    6    7.4  875    9.6 
7    5.7  875    9.6    7    4.3  438  11.3 
8    8.1  875  10.4    8    4.1  875  10.4 
9    9.8  875  14.1    9    8.3  438  14.4 
10    5.2  875    8.8    10  10.1  875  17.8 
   35
Table 2:    Fraction of Female Headed Households among Non-Recipient, 
Recipient, and All Households, in Rural and Urban Areas  
 
   Urban Households 












   27.4  45.9  30.2 
 
   Rural Households 
















Table 3.  Distribution of Non-Recipient and Recipient Households, 
By Schooling of the Adult Female  
 
   Urban Households 
Years of schooling 











0 – 3  35.3  48.7  875 
4 – 6  20.2  20.5  875 
7 – 9  16.1    9.7  875 
 9 – 12  17.4  14.9  875 
13 +  11.1    6.2  875 
  
  Rural Households 
Years of schooling 











0 - 3  75.3  80.3  875 
4 - 6  17.5  14.5  656 
7 - 9    5.2  3.8  875 
9 or more    2.0  1.5  438 
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Table 4.  Distribution of Non Recipient and Recipient Households, 
by the Number of School-Age Children 
 
Urban Households 












none 32.2  36.4  875 
1 23.3  26.4  875 
2 23.3  18.1  438 
3 or more  21.1  19.1  875 
 
Rural  Households 












none 28.0  31.0  875 
1 19.4  26.6  875 
2 18.8  15.8  875 






Table 5.  Placement of Children in the School System,  
Percentages by Age Group, 1997  
 
Age  Target grade  No school  In grade  Behind  Dropout  Total
4 – 6  Pre-school  64.2  35.8      100 
7 – 9  I cycle of primary (1-3)  13.1  83.9    1.8    1.2  100 
10 – 12  II cycle of primary (4-5)   6.5  60.2  28.6    4.7  100 
13 – 15  II cycle of primary (6-9)   5.5  45.2  30.5  18.9  100 
16 – 18  Secondary (10-12)    7.5  30.0  22.4  40.1  100 
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Table 6.  Annual Growth in School Registration, by Grade Level  
(Average for 1990-96) 
 
Total Urban Rural  Level Target 






Pre-K  4 – 6  20.7 24.0  12.6  10.1 8.6  12.6 53.1  57.5 11.9 
1 – 9  7 – 15  4.2 3.9  5.9  1.5 0.2  6.7 7.5  7.7 -0.6 




Table 7.  Distribution of School Attainment in 1997, by Age 
 
Age  No school  Primary I  Primary II  Primary III  Secondary  Post-Sec  Total 
24 – 25  12.9  15.2  22.6  23.8  19.7  5.7  100 
26 – 30  14.3  15.9  22.1  18.5  20.3  9.0  100 
31 – 35  17.8  17.7  19.9  16.9  16.6  11.1  100 
36 – 40  22.2  18.7  21.3  13.9  14.2  9.7  100 
41 – 45  24.2  21.3  23.2  12.0  13.0  6.3  100 
46 – 50  31.4  25.2  21.9    7.2    9.4  4.9  100 
51 – 55  34.1  25.2  20.5    7.8    7.1  5.3  100 
56 – 60  41.6  24.8  16.9    5.2    5.3  6.2  100 
61 – 65  46.2  25.9  16.1    4.3    3.7  3.8  100 
66 – 70  53.1  24.8  12.3    2.7    4.1  3.1  100 
71 +  58.0  20.8  14.0    3.0    2.3  2.0  100 




Table 8.  Household Income and Remittances in 1997, 
    By Region (full sample, in Colones) 
 
 Urban  Rural 
Average household income  4,105   1,768 
Per capita average household income  1,081    419 
Recipient households (% of all)   15%   14% 
Median remittance (among recipients)     875    875 
Average remittance (among recipients)  1,183    909 
 





Table 9.  Estimates of the Determinants of the Hazard of Leaving School,  
Urban Areas 
(Cox Proportional Hazard Stratified by Birth Cohort)  
  
  Specification that uses 
income (in hundreds of 
Colones) 
Covariate; segment of the hazard over which the effect 







Male  1.274  .058     5.32 
Parental schooling; never enrolled, 1
st-6
th grade    .801  .011  − 15.98
Parental schooling; 7
th-9
th grade    .860  .012  − 10.69
Parental schooling; 10
th-12
th grade    .927  .009    − 8.10
No access to water or electricity  2.553  .272      8.81 
Income (net of remittance)    .996  .001    − 3.47
Remittance amount; never enrolled, 1
st-6
th grade    .916  .016    − 5.08
Remittance amount; 7
th-12
th grade    .965  .008    − 4.48




1.111  .021     5.59 




1.084  .024     3.58 
Log-likelihood  − 11,843.387 
Number of observations  7,382 
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Table 10.  Estimates of the Determinants of the Hazard of Leaving School,  
Rural Areas 
(Cox Proportional Hazard Stratified by Birth Cohort) 
   
Covariate; segment of the hazard over which the effect 







Male; never enrolled, 7
th-12
th grade  1.156  .054     3.07 
Male; 1
st-6
th grade     .902  .046    − 2.02
Parental schooling; never enrolled     .839  .015  − 10.06
Parental schooling; 1
st-6
th grade     .874  .013    − 9.41
Parental schooling; 7
th-12
th grade     .923  .015    − 4.83
No access to water or electricity; never enrolled  1.856  .138      8.29 
No access to water or electricity; 1
st-6
th grade  1.334  .088      4.36 
Income (net of remittance); never enrolled, 1
st-6
th grade   .993  .002    − 3.44
Income (net of remittance); 7
th-12
th grade  1.000  .002      0.05 
Remittance amount    .983  .011    − 1.57
Receives remittance    .764  .088    − 2.35
Log-likelihood  − 19,443.516 
Number of observations  6,904 
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Table 11.  Estimated Survival Functions, by Birth Cohort 
Urban Areas  
 
Birth Cohort  
Grade 
Level  1972-75 1976-79 1980-83 1984-87 1988-90 
    0   .971  .976  .982  .965  .919 
    1   .962  .970  .976  .960  .915 
    2   .946  .959  .964  .951  .912 
    3   .926  .942  .948  .946  .912 
    4   .902  .918  .932  .941  .912 
    5   .879  .898  .916  .936   
    6   .829  .861  .901  .929   
    7   .808  .838  .892  .929   
    8   .792  .819  .884  .929   
    9   .699  .761  .884     
   10   .684  .752  .862     
   11   .672  .743  .856     
   12   .491  .635  .856     
 
 
Table 12.  Estimated Survival Functions, by Birth Cohort 
Rural Areas  
 
Birth Cohort  
Grade 
Level  1972-75 1976-79 1980-83 1984-87 1988-90 
    0   .832  .854  .896  .891  .645 
    1   .787  .814  .856  .863  .634 
    2   .679  .714  .781  .837  .630 
    3   .552  .601  .701  .816  .613 
    4   .445  .493  .617  .797  .613 
    5   .353  .393  .539  .793   
    6   .217  .276  .441  .773   
    7   .192  .246  .420  .773   
    8   .174  .229  .408  .773   
    9   .110  .150  .333     
   10   .101  .143  .333     
   11   .095  .140  .333     
   12   .035  .071  .333     




















Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by area
Grade level















Figure 2.  Estimated survival functions, by level of parental 
schooling, for urban and rural areas. (Household income is set at the 
median for each area.  The functions correspond to the 1976-79 birth 
cohorts) 
Grade level---Urban areas
 0 years (10th centile)  3 years (1st quartile)
 6 years (median)  11 years (3rd quartile)








 0 years (10th & 25th centiles) 2 years (median)
 4 years (3rd quartile)  6 years (90th centile)










Figure 3.  Estimated survival functions, by level of household income, 
for urban and rural areas. (Parental schooling is set at the median for 
each area.  The functions correspond to the 1976-79 birth cohorts) 
Grade level---Urban areas
 826 colones (10th centile)  1,517 colones (1st quartile)
 2,742 colones (median)  4,583 colones (3rd quartile)








 430 colones (10th centile)  750 colones (1st quartile)
 1,290 colones (median)  2,225 colones (3rd quartile)








Figure 4.  Estimated survival functions, with and without remittances 
in urban and rural areas. (Household income and parental schooling 
are set at the median for each area.  The functions correspond to the 
1976-79 birth cohorts) 
Grade level---Rural areas
 no remittance 875 colones (median)








 no remittance  875 colones (median)












Figure 5. Estimated survivor functions, by birth cohort
Grade level---Urban areas
 1972-75 1976-79
 1980-83  1984-87












Figure 6. Estimated survivor functions, by birth cohort
Grade level---Rural areas
 1972-75 1976-79
 1980-83  1984-87













       
 
 
Figure 7. Estimated baseline hazards, by birth cohort
Grade level---Urban areas
 1972-75 1976-79
 1980-83  1984-87









Figure 8. Estimated baseline hazards, by birth cohort
Grade level---Rural areas
 1972-75 1976-79
 1980-83  1984-87











Specification of the Statistical Model 
 
We analyze separately the behavior of rural and urban households.  The key reason being 
the presence of factors we cannot control for that affect the demand for schooling in rural 
areas.  Schools are more readily available in urban areas; the living conditions in urban 
areas are much better than in rural areas, and the organization of the economy, 
particularly in the way it affects the costs of attending school is less favorable to 
schooling in rural than urban areas.  The separate analyses are not driven by the 
assumption that perceived benefits from schooling differ between rural and urban areas.  
El Salvador is a relatively small and densely populated country; the fact that internal 
migration is significant does not justify that assumption.  Nevertheless, we tested the null 
hypothesis that the urban and rural samples can be combined and the estimated 
coefficients are equal for the two samples.  We reject the null hypothesis, with a p-value 
for the test statistic equal to 0.00.  As a second check, we tested the null hypothesis that, 
while the underlying baseline hazards differ for the urban and rural samples, the effect of 
the covariates on the hazards are the equal for the two samples.  Once again, we reject the 
null hypothesis, with a p-value for the test statistic equal to 0.00. 
 
The crucial assumption in the Cox proportional hazard model is that the hazard ratio is 
proportional over the entire base line.  For example, if the hazard of leaving school is 30 
percent higher for boys than for girls, the proportional hazard assumption implies that 
this ratio is the same in the first grade, the fifth grade, or at any grade level.  In our search 
for a parsimonious specification, we paid special attention to the validity of the 
proportionality assumption.  We tested the assumption for each individual covariate and 
conducted a global test.
14   
 
                                                           
14 Grambsch and Therneau (1994) proposed a scaled adjustment of the Schoenfeld residuals and a global 
test of the proportionality assumption based on the adjusted residuals.  The global test and a chi-squared 
test for individual covariates are implemented in STATA 6.0 (1999).   48
The testing revealed that the proportionality assumption was invalid for at least one 
covariate in the urban and the rural samples.  We relaxed the assumption of 
proportionality by allowing the covariates to have different effects over four segments of 
the baseline hazard.  The segments are “never enrolled,” 1




th grade, and 10
th through the 12
th grade.
15  When we repeated the tests we 
found that the variable “year of birth” continued to fail the proportionality test.  
Consequently, we estimated separate models for the urban and rural samples allowing 
separate effects for the four segments of the baseline hazard, and we stratified each 
sample on individual year of birth.  Inspection of the estimated baseline hazard and 
survival function for each stratum revealed that it is reasonable to combine the 
observations into 5 strata according to year of birth.  The four oldest strata combine 
individuals born in four-year intervals: 1972 to 1975, 1976 to 1979, 1980 to 1983, and 
1984 to 1987.  The youngest stratum is for individuals born between 1988 and 1990. 
 
The next step in the specification search involved testing the null hypothesis that the 
effect of the covariates is the same for all the strata.  We estimated a fully interacted 
model, where the effect of each covariate was allowed to differ between strata and 
segments of the baseline hazard, separately for the urban and rural samples.  Then, we 
estimated the model that imposes the constraints contained in the null hypothesis.  For 
the urban sample, the likelihood ratio test results in rejection of the null hypothesis.  The 
test statistic is equal to 97.69 with 69 degrees of freedom, and a p-value equal to 0.013.  
When we allow the effects to differ for the youngest stratum, those born between 1988 
and 1990, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effects of the covariates are equal 
                                                           
15We divided the baseline hazard into the segments listed in text based on the following considerations.  
Primary education is divided into three cycles of three grades each.  Therefore, when distance to school 
becomes a problem, it is likely it will happen when a child is ready to enroll in the next cycle of primary 
education or secondary education.  In addition, public education becomes relatively scarce at the third 
cycle of primary education, and close to half of secondary education is private.  This suggests that out-of-
pocket costs of additional years of schooling beyond the sixth grade rise relative to schooling at younger 
ages.  In addition, in the early stages of estimation we divided the hazard further, allowing for separate 
effects for the 1
st through the 3
rd grade, and the 4
th through the 6
th grade.  But we did not reject the null 
hypothesis that the segments could be combined into one covering the 1
st through the 6
th grade.   49
for the remaining 4 strata.  The test statistic is equal to 55.79 with 58 degrees of freedom, 
and a p-value equal to 0.558.
16   
 
We continued testing nested hypotheses aimed at simplifying the specification as much 
as possible.  Finally, we reduced the original specification that had 93 separate effects to 
one with 10 effects.  The covariates in our preferred specification for the urban sample 
are:  
1.  an indicator for sex  
2.  parental schooling—first two segments of the hazard  
3.  parental schooling—third segment of the hazard  
4.  parental schooling—fourth segment of the hazard  
5.  an indicator for lack of access to basic services  
6.  household income   
7.  remittance amount—first two segments of the hazard  
8.  remittance amount—last two segments of the hazard 
9.  an indicator variable for the youngest stratum interacted with parental schooling for 
the first two segments of the hazard  
10. an indicator variable for the youngest stratum interacted with the remittance amount 
for the first two segments of the hazard. 
 
Note that we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the presence of remittances (after 
controlling for the remittance amount) has no effect on the hazard of leaving school, and 
therefore, we drop it from the specification for the urban sample. 
 
                                                           
16 We use six covariates: indicators for sex, lack of access to basic services, and presence of remittances, 
parental schooling, location on the income distribution, and change in the location due to the remittance.  
We allow the effects to differ for four segments of the hazard.  Therefore, in principle, the set of estimated 
coefficients for each stratum has 24 (6 ×  4) coefficients.  Note that that two tests described in text only 
differ by 11 degrees of freedom.  The reason is that there are no observations in the later segments of the 
baseline hazard for the younger birth cohorts—no one born in 1988 is in the 7
th grade or beyond by 1996, 
the survey year.  Also, there are no observations with “no access to basic services” falling in the second 
segment of the hazard.  Consequently, we can only estimate 11 separate parameters for the youngest 
stratum, which explains the difference of 11 degrees of freedom between the tests.   50
The individual tests of the null hypothesis of proportionality for each of the ten variables 
listed fail to reject the null hypothesis.  The largest test statistic is for household income.  
It is equal to 2.68, and is asymptotically distributed chi-squared with 1 degree of 
freedom, so the p-value for the test is equal to 0.102.  When we perform the global test of 
the null hypothesis of proportionality of effects over all segments of the baseline hazard, 
the test statistic is equal to 4.38, with 10 degrees of freedom, and a p-value equal to 
0.929, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
For the rural sample, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effects of the covariates 
are equal for all strata.  The statistic for the likelihood ratio test is equal to 82.08, 
distributed with 66 degrees of freedom, and the p-value is equal to 0.088.  But we reject 
the null hypothesis that the covariates have the same effect on all four segments of the 
baseline hazard.  Through sequential testing we arrived at the simplest specification of 
the model that does not violate the proportionality assumption of the Cox proportional 
hazard model.  There are eleven covariates in the specification: 
1.  an indicator for sex—first, third and fourth segments of the hazard  
2.  an indicator for sex—second segment of the hazard  
3.  parental schooling—first segment of the hazard  
4.  parental schooling—second segment of the hazard  
5.  parental schooling—third and fourth segments of the hazard  
6.  an indicator for lack of access to basic services—first segment of the hazard  
7.  an indicator for lack of access to basic services—second segment of the hazard  
8.  household income—first and second segments of the hazard  
9.  household income—third and fourth segments of the hazard 
10. remittance amount 
11. an indicator for the presence of  remittances 
 
We failed to reject the null hypothesis that lack of access to basic services, for the third 
and fourth segments of the hazard (that is, the 7
th through the 12
th grade), has no effect on 
the hazard of leaving school.   51
The individual tests of the null hypothesis of proportionality for each of the ten variables 
listed fail to reject the null hypothesis.  The largest test statistic is for parental schooling 
for the second segment of the hazard.  It is equal to 3.10, and is asymptotically 
distributed chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom, so the p-value for the test is equal to 
0.078.  When we perform the global test of the null hypothesis of proportionality of 
effects over all segments of the baseline hazard, the test statistic is equal to 12.14, with 
11 degrees of freedom, and a p-value equal to 0.353, and we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 
We conclude the discussion of our specification search noting that “Parental schooling” 
is the only covariate with a different effect on the hazard of leaving school at different 
grade levels, both in the urban and the rural samples. 
 
The pattern of effects of parental schooling estimated for the urban and rural samples has 
intuitive appeal.  As a child progresses through the school system, the child’s own school 
experience will weigh more heavily, and the parents’ schooling will weigh less heavily, 
in the evaluation of the returns to additional schooling for the child.  In the sociology of 
education literature, the declining effect of “family background” variables (typically 
parental schooling and family income) on ever-higher school grade transitions has been 
interpreted as “dynamic selection bias.”  In other words, family background correlates 
with unobserved factors like ability, and as the group of students who attain ever-higher 
grade levels becomes smaller and smaller it also becomes increasingly less representative 
of the population of individuals of that age because they are of above-average ability.  
The effect of family background variables declines because the correlation of these 
variables with unobserved ability fades away as the sample of “survivors” gets smaller 
and average ability in the sample increases. 
 
Cameron and Heckman (1998) argue that the standard model used in the sociology of 
education literature, a logit specification, together with the data typically used to estimate 
it require ad hoc distributional assumptions before inferences regarding dynamic 
selectivity bias can be made.  They estimate a logit model and an ordered discrete-choice   52
model with corrections for unobserved heterogeneity.  The logit results are of interest 
because they allow a comparison of parameter estimates with and without corrections for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Comparing the estimates for variables capturing parental schooling and family income 
reported in Cameron and Heckman’s Tables 1 and 4, it is clear that the selectivity 
correction makes scant difference for primary and secondary schooling.  The effect of 
correcting for selectivity is concentrated in graduating from high school and higher 
schooling levels.  Moreover, in their preferred specification, the ordered discrete-choice 
model, the estimates of the density of “ability” at various schooling levels suggest that 
the density for high school graduates is only slightly to the right of the baseline density.  
We interpret Cameron and Heckman’s results as suggesting that dynamic selectivity bias 
is unimportant in primary and secondary schooling.  Indeed, in most countries the 
curriculum is set at a level of difficulty that allows near universal graduation from 
primary school and very high graduation rates from secondary school.   
 
For several reasons, we have elected not to implement a correction for selectivity.  First, 
the evidence discussed in the paragraph above suggests that dynamic selectivity bias is a 
minor problem for the analysis of grades 1 through 12, the grades we examine.  Second, 
our results do not conform to the typical pattern found in logit models: our estimate of the 
effect of family income declines for higher grade levels in rural but not in urban areas.  
Third, assume we found a lowering of the hazard of leaving school in grades 1 through 6 
and an increase in the hazard of leaving school after the 6
th grade over time.  It is possible 
that the increase in the hazard beyond the 6
th grade would be due to a “worsening” of the 
pool of students because of higher retention rates in grades 1 through 6.  We could 
conclude erroneously that matters have gotten worse in grades 7 through 12.  But we 
have found no such pattern.  We estimate improvements in retention rates at all grade 
levels as we move from the oldest to the most recent birth cohorts. 